Briefing Note: EIUG Submission on Eskom’s Retail Tariff Plan 2025/26
Date of Submission: 17 January 2025
Submitted by: Energy Intensive Users Group of Southern Africa (EIUG)
1. Context and Purpose
The Energy Intensive Users Group (EIUG), representing consumers responsible for ~40% of South Africa’s electricity demand, submitted detailed comments to NERSA on Eskom’s proposed RTP 2025/26. The submission addresses tariff structure changes, cost allocation, cross-subsidies, and the impact on self-generation and private investment. This note distills the main issues and recommendations relevant to energy intensive consumers.
2. Key Issues Raised
2.1 Time-of-Use (TOU) Tariff Structure
- Support for TOU Ratio Change:
EIUG supports reducing the ratio between low-season off-peak and high-season peak charges from 1:8 to 1:6. This adjustment is expected to incentivize more distributed plant maintenance and improve production efficiency and competitiveness. - Evening Peak Extension:
EIUG supports increasing evening peak hours from 2 to 3, but notes that most members cannot shift load for more than two hours. A staggered approach is recommended, allowing some users to shift in the first two hours and others in the last two. - Impact on Demand Response:
Extending the peak period may negatively affect existing demand management projects, especially in mining and smelting, where operational cycles are tightly linked to the current two-hour peak.
2.2 Cost Allocation and Cross-Subsidies
- Cost of Service (CoS) Approach:
EIUG agrees with using an embedded cost-of-service study for cost allocation, as it aligns with regulatory best practice and provides fairer outcomes than marginal cost approaches. - Cross-Subsidies:
EIUG opposes cross-subsidies as an inefficient means of supporting vulnerable groups. Instead, it advocates for direct, transparent, and targeted fiscal subsidies (e.g., cash grants) for low-income households and, if needed, for vulnerable large power users during the transition to cost-reflective tariffs. - Municipal Tariff Rationalisation:
EIUG supports consolidating municipal tariffs for large power users, provided cross-subsidies are minimized and cost-reflectivity is improved.
2.3 Fixed Charges and Generation Capacity Charge (GCC)
- Opposition to Immediate GCC Introduction:
EIUG is concerned that introducing a Generation Capacity Charge (GCC) now will:- Disincentivise self-generation projects, which are critical for closing the supply gap.
- Reduce Eskom’s incentive to improve plant performance, as fixed revenue would be guaranteed regardless of output.
- Only once supply constraints are resolved and generation performance is acceptable should a GCC be considered.
- Impact on Distributed Generation:
Higher fixed charges and the GCC would undermine the economics of both wheeled and embedded private generation, slowing investment in self-generation and storage. - Recommendation:
If GCC is introduced, it should be phased in gradually and linked to service quality incentives (SQIs) and penalties for Eskom’s generation performance.
2.4 Ancillary Services and Legacy Charges
- Ancillary Services:
EIUG notes that as the grid shifts toward more variable renewable energy, robust ancillary services will be needed. If Eskom cannot provide these, private sector procurement should be considered, but current rates may not be sufficient to incentivize participation. - Legacy Charges:
EIUG recommends that legacy charges be split out, with only the S34 IPP premium escalated by CPI, not by the Eskom MYPD determination.
2.5 Distribution Losses
- Concerns Over Loss Allocation:
EIUG highlights that customers under 66kV are unfairly burdened with increased distribution losses, including non-technical losses (theft).- Recommendation: Technical and non-technical losses should be separated, and non-technical losses socialized across all consumers.
2.6 Private Generation and Wheeling
- Negative Impact of Tariff Changes:
The introduction of legacy and capacity charges will negatively affect the business case for private generation and wheeling, limiting users’ ability to manage costs through operational or technological changes. - Recommendation:
The impact on private generation and the pace of deployment should be carefully assessed, as these are critical for national energy security, cost containment, and decarbonization.
3. Additional Technical and Policy Recommendations
- TOU for Small Power Users:
EIUG supports the introduction of TOU tariffs for small power users (SPUs) where smart meters are available, to provide efficient price signals and reduce peak demand. - Service Charges (R/account to R/POD):
EIUG does not support allocating service charges by Points of Delivery (POD) rather than by account, as this would increase costs for multi-site users without reflecting real service cost differences. - Subsidy Framework:
EIUG calls for a national subsidy framework that ensures subsidies are explicit, targeted, time-bound, and do not create market distortions.
4. Summary Table: EIUG Positions on Key RTP Elements
| Issue | EIUG Position / Recommendation |
| TOU Ratio & Peak Hours | Support 1:6 ratio, support 3-hour peak with staggered implementation |
| Generation Capacity Charge | Oppose immediate introduction; consider only after supply constraints are resolved |
| Fixed Charges | Oppose increases now; would harm self-generation and distributed generation investments |
| Ancillary Services | Need robust, possibly private sector-sourced, with adequate incentives |
| Legacy Charges | Split out S34 IPP premium, escalate only by CPI |
| Distribution Losses | Separate technical/non-technical; socialize non-technical losses across all consumers |
| Cross-Subsidies | Replace with direct, transparent fiscal subsidies |
| Private Generation | Assess tariff impacts carefully; avoid undermining investment in self- and distributed generation |
| Service Charges (R/POD) | Oppose; prefer R/account allocation |
5. Conclusion
The EIUG submission emphasizes the need for tariff structures that support investment in self-generation, fair cost allocation, and the elimination of market-distorting cross-subsidies. Immediate introduction of higher fixed charges and the GCC is opposed, as it would undermine private investment and Eskom’s performance incentives. Direct, transparent subsidies are preferred for vulnerable groups, and robust ancillary services are needed as the energy mix evolves.
For energy intensive consumers, the proposed RTP changes present both risks (higher fixed costs, reduced flexibility) and opportunities (improved TOU signals, potential for more rational cost allocation). Active engagement with NERSA and Eskom is essential to ensure that tariff reforms support, rather than hinder, industrial competitiveness and energy security.



